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States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and/or at the district court level in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division:
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company: Plaintiff, Counter Defendant, Crossclaim
Defendant, and Appellant
Plaintiff Intervenor, Cross Claimant, and
Unigard Insurance Company:
Appellee
Plaintiff, Counter Defendant and
West American Insurance Company:
Crossclaim Defendant
Defendant and Counter Claimant
Cloud Nine, LLC:
Defendant and Counter Claimant
Easy Seat, LLC:
Defendant and Counter Claimant
Rodney Ford:
Defendant and Counter Claimant
Blaine Ford:
Defendant and Counter Claimant
Rex Haddock:
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QUESTION CERTIFIED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
In its Order dated June 18, 2009, this Court stated that it accepts the following
question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit: "As to the
EdiZone case described in the certification order, whether the defense costs should be
allocated between Appellant [Ohio Casualty] and Appellee [Unigard] under the "equal
shares" method set forth in the "other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or
according to the "time on the risk" method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.. 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997)." Addendum, Order dated June
18, 2009 (Exhibit "C").
LAW OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE1
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
which are determinative of the certified question or of central importance to the certified
question or appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE NATURE OF CASE

The above-captioned matter is a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights
and obligations of two insurers in providing defense and indemnification for two insured
limited liability companies and their members for a civil suit brought by a product and
technology developer who had entered into a license agreement with the insureds. The two
insured limited liability companies are Defendants and Counter Claimants Cloud Nine,
1

Pursuant to the Court's Briefing Notice, dated July 20, 2009, Appellee Unigard
Insurance Company has not included within its Opening Brief a statement of jurisdiction
and statement of issues as required by Subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) of URAP 24.
7

LLC, and Easy Seat, LLC, and their members are Defendants and Counter Claimants
Rodney Ford, Blaine Ford and Rex Haddock (collectively referred to as the "Cloud Nine
Defendants"). The successive insurers of the Cloud Nine Defendants are Appellant The
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty") (June 2001-2002) and Appellee
Unigard Insurance Company ("Unigard") (December 2002-2005).3 The product and
technology developer is Edizone LC and the underlying suit was Edizone, LC v. Cloud
Nine, LLC, et ai, Civil No. 1:04CV00117 (referred to as the "Edizone Suit") filed in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, before the
Honorable Ted Stewart.
In August 2004, Edizone filed the Edizone Suit against the Cloud Nine Defendants
and other entities asserting various statutory, tort and contract causes of action arising
from alleged violation of the License Agreement for "Gelastic™" and "GellyComb™"
technologies, and alleged infringement of Edizone's patents, trademarks, trade names, and
logos while marketing, advertising and selling the Cloud Nine Defendants' products.
Shortly after being served with the Edizone Suit's Complaint, the Cloud Nine
Defendants tendered their defense to Ohio Casualty and Unigard based on the Personal
and Advertising Injury Liability coverage included in the policies of insurance. Ohio
Casualty denied the Cloud Nine Defendants' tender and filed the above-captioned action
2

The Cloud Nine Defendants did not participate in the briefing or oral argument before
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
3
The Cloud Nine Defendants were also insured by West American Insurance Company for
the period of 1998-2001 and West American is an original Plaintiff in this action. However,
in the proceedings before the district court, the parties agreed that none of the allegations of
the Edizone Suit triggered a duty to defend or indemnify under the policies issued by West
American.
8

in July 2005 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division,
before the Honorable Tena Campbell. Unigard accepted the Cloud Nine Defendants'
tender of defense under a reservation of rights and sought intervention into the abovecaptioned action.
On May 22, 2006, Unigard filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Insurers' Defense Obligations asserting that: 1) both Ohio Casualty and
Unigard owe a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit; and 2) the
costs to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants should be shared equally (50/50 basis)
between Unigard and Ohio Casualty. Ohio Casualty opposed Unigard's Motion arguing
that it owed no duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants, but even if it did owe a
defense, the apportionment of defense obligations between the co-insurers should be
based on a "time on the risk" method of apportionment, such that it owes 3/45ths of the
defense costs based on a time ratio of three months on the risk. Ohio Casualty also
argued that the Cloud Nine Defendants owe an apportionment of the defense costs for a
six-month time period of time between June and December 2002 in which it was not
insured (6/45ths), and that Unigard owes the remaining amount of the defense costs
(36/45ths).
The district court heard oral argument on Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on September 21, 2006. On November 14, 2006, the district court issued an
Order and Memorandum Decision granting Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment ordering that both Ohio Casualty and Unigard owe a duty to defend the Cloud
Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit, and ordering that the defense costs and fees
9

incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendant are to be shared by Ohio Casualty and
Unigard on an equal basis. See APLT APP, v. 13, at 2062-2078; see also Addendum,
District Court Order and Memorandum Decision at 1-17 (Exhibit "A"). In making its
ruling, the district court rejected Ohio Casualty's method of apportionment based on
months on the risk, finding that an "equal shares" apportionment method is supported by
the Other Insurance provisions found in the insurance policies issued by Ohio Casualty
and Unigard, as well as Utah's law regarding an insurer's duty to defend. See APLT
APP, v. 13, at 2076-2078 (Vol. 13). Ohio Casualty filed a Motion to Reconsider, which
the district court denied on January 24, 2007. See APLT APP, v. 13, at 2132.
During the months which followed, Ohio Casualty and Unigard paid and/or
received reimbursement for their respective fifty percent/equal share of the defense costs
based on the district court's Order and Memorandum Decision. Additionally, in July
2007, Ohio Casualty and Unigard were able to resolve the claims alleged against the
Cloud Nine Defendants by entering into a settlement agreement with Edizone, LC. The
claims alleged against the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit were dismissed,
and as such, the remaining issues regarding the insurers' obligations of indemnification
became moot in this action. On November 27, 2007, the district court's order granting
Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Insurers' Defense
Obligations became a final and appealable order when the district court granted the Order
on Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, dismissing all remaining claims with prejudice. See
APLT APP, v. 13, at 2144-2146.

10

Ohio Casualty appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in
favor of Unigard to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, on the sole issue of
apportionment of defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. See Notice of
Appeal, APLT APP, v. 13, at 2147-2149. Ohio Casualty did not appeal the district
court's initial finding that Ohio Casualty and Unigard owe a duty to defend the Cloud
Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit. See id. Ohio Casualty and Unigard filed appellate
briefs and on January 14, 2009, the Tenth Circuit Court heard oral argument on the
matter. On April 28, 2009, the Tenth Circuit Court issued an Order requesting this Court
to exercise its discretion to accept the certified question of whether defense costs should
be allocated based on the Other Insurance Provision or using the time-on-risk method
described in the case of Sharon Steel v. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. And Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127
(1997). See Addendum, Tenth Circuit Order, dated April 28, 2009 at 3 (Exhibit "B").
On June 18, 2009, this Court issued an Order accepting the certified questioned and
stating it in the following manner:
As to the EdiZone case described in the certification order,
whether the defense costs should be allocated between
Appellant and Appellee under the "equal shares" method set
forth in the "other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or
according to the "time on the risk" method described in
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d
127, 140 (Utah 1997).
Addendum, Order, dated June 18, 2009, at 1 (Exhibit "C").
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On July 6, 2005, Ohio Casualty filed its Complaint for Declaratory

Judgment to determine the rights and obligations, if any, of the insurers of the Cloud
11

Nine Defendants West American, Ohio Casualty and Unigard in providing defense and
indemnification for the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit. (APLT APP, v. 1-2,
at 16-438).
2.

The Edizone Suit was a civil suit brought by a product and technology

developer, Edizone, which licensed patents and other intellectual property to the Cloud
Nine Defendants for manufacture and sale of an elastomer gel technology and product
known as "Gelastic" and "GellyComb." (APLT APP, v. 1, at 54-103).
3.

From April 7, 1998 until March 11, 2002, the Cloud Nine Defendants had a

license agreement with Edizone, whereby they could use Edizone's trademarks and
intellectual property. Id. However, on March 11, 2002, Edizone terminated the Cloud
Nine Defendants' license agreement. (APLT APP, v. 1, at 61, f 47).
4.

Notwithstanding the license termination on March 11, 2002, Edizone

alleged that the Cloud Nine Defendants continued to make, market, advertise, sell, and/or
alter the elements of GellyComb products in violation of its intellectual property rights.
(APLT APP, v. 1, at 62-63).
5.

As a result of the Cloud Nine Defendants' alleged infringement of

Edizone's patents, trademarks, trade names, and logos/graphics while marketing,
advertising, and selling their products after the lease termination, Edizone filed suit on
August 26, 2004. (APLT APP, v. 1, at 54-103).

12

6.

Edizone's Complaints4 generally asserted multiple and continuing incidents

of marketing and advertising activities (e.g. websites, metatags) which allegedly
infringed upon its patents, trademarks, trade names, website graphics and logos and
injured its established good will in the market. Edizone sought equitable relief and
damages for the alleged infringing and injurious activities. (APLT APP, v. 1, at 54-103
[Complaint] and v. 10, at 1577-1622 [Second Amended Complaint]).5
7.

During the period of time that the alleged infringing offenses occurred, the

Cloud Nine Defendants were insured by separate, non-concurrent, insurance policies
issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard. (APLT APP, v. 2, at 323 and v. 4, at 632).
8.

Ohio Casualty provided liability insurance coverage to Cloud Nine with a

policy period of from June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002. (APLT APP, v. 2, at 323 and v. 6,
at 1048).
9.

Unigard provided liability insurance coverage for a three-year period from

December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005. (APLT APP, v. 4, at 632, 665; v. 5, at 820984).
10.

During the six month gap between the expiration of the Ohio Casualty

policy on June 10, 2002, and the inception of the Unigard policy on December 12, 2002,
the Cloud Nine Defendants were uninsured. (APLT APP, v. 6, at 1069).
4

Edizone filed an First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint during its
suit against the Cloud Nine Defendants.
For a more complete and detailed account of the alleged offenses of the Cloud Nine
Defendants and alleged injuries asserted by Edizone as quoted from Edizone's
Complaints, please refer to the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Unigard's
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Insurers'
Defense Obligations. (APLT APP v. 4, at 662-677).
n

11.

For the first nine months of Ohio Casualty's policy from June 10, 2001

until March 11, 2002, the Cloud Nine Defendants had a license agreement with Edizone,
whereby they could use Edizone's trademarks and intellectual property, thus, Edizone
could not and did not assert claims for any advertising injury during that period.
Accordingly, it is Ohio Casualty's contention that it only had three months on the risk,
dating from the termination of the license agreement to the end of its policy period, i.e.;
March 11, 2002 through June 10, 2002. (APLT APP, v. 2, at 323, 337).
12.

The Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies provide liability insurance

coverage for personal and advertising injury to the Cloud Nine Defendants. The Policies'
"Insuring Agreement" for personal and advertising injury are identical and provide, in
relevant part:
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will
have the right and duty to defend the insured against any
"suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty
to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does
not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense
and settle any claim or "suit" that may result.
*

*

*

*

b. This insurance applies to:
"personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense arising
out of your business but only if the offense was committed in
the "coverage territory" during the policy period.
(APLT APP, v. 2, at 337 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 917 [Unigard Policy]).
13.

The Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies define personal and advertising

injury, as it relates to the claims in the Edizone Suit, as:

14

SI«TIOI ' I \ ' Dl'l'INI'I'IONS
I

i

I•

*

"Personal and advertising injury" means injur v including
consequential "bodily injury" arising out of OIK or more of the
following offenses:
*

*

*

*

he use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement", or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, tnde dress or slogan m \ -ur
"advertisement."
(APL 1 APP, v. 2 at 345; [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5 at 928 [Unigard Policy]).
1A
If iSilFtibv

The Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies further contain idei itical Other
|MO

\\\}\\\

\\ lilt

III

i l l p.il I

Other Insurance
If other \alid and vollcclihlc insurance is a\ailable to ihc
insured lor a lo<s we cover under Coxerages A or R of this
Coverage Part, *-IM obligations arc limited as follows:
a. Primary Insurance
This insurance is primary except when h oelow applies. If
this insurance is primary, our obligations arc not a fleeted
unless any of the oilier insurance is also primary - 1 hen. u e
v. ill duire with all thai oilier insurance b\ (he method
described in c. below
c. Method in Sharing
If all of the other insurance permits conn h^nion b\ equal
shares, we will follow this method also. 1 nder this approach
each insi irer contributes equal ainouuK u. : d n ha^ paid its
applicable limit of insurance or none of the loss remains,
whichever comes first.
If any other insurance does no i pcrnm uM.inhtiiiuh i-; ^quai
shares, we will contribute by limits, tinder this method, each
insurer's share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of
insurance to the total applicable hmU:> oi insurance of all
insurers.
(API • I \P;i \ \ 2, at 342-343 [01 lie > Casualty Policy] i u i< 1 v 5, i it 924 925 [I It ligard
lv

i c > ])•

is

15.

The one Ohio Casualty Policy and three Unigard Policies provide identical

liability policy limits for personal and advertising injury of $1,000,000.00. (APLT APP,
v. 2, at 324 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 906 [Unigard Policy]).
16.

On May 22, 2006, Unigard filed a motion for partial summary judgment,

arguing that as a matter of law both insurers had a duty to defend the Cloud Nine
Defendants, and all defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants
should be shared equally (50/50) between Unigard and Ohio Casualty. (APLT APP, v. 4,
at 654-656).
17.

The parties fully briefed Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

Judge Campbell heard oral argument on the Motion on September 21, 2006 and issued an
Order Memorandum Decision on November 14, 2006 granting Unigard5s Motion.
(APLT APP, v. 1, at 1-15); see also Addendum, Order and Memorandum Decision dated
November 14, 2006 (Exhibit "A").
18.

In regards to the insurers' duty to defend, the district court made the

following findings and ruling:
In short, the Edizone allegations fall within the definition of
advertising injury as the offense of "use of another's
advertising idea in your 'advertisement,'" and the first part of
the Novell test is satisfied.
*

*

*

*

The second part of the Novell test is also met because
Edizone's Complaint alleges a causal connection between
Edizone's injuries and the Cloud Nine Defendants'
advertising activities. Edizone alleges that it has suffered
injury to its trade names as a result of the Cloud Nine
misconduct and it expressly seeks relief prohibiting the Cloud
Nine Defendants from using the trade names and trademarks
on their websites, in advertising or in any other way. Those
16

Hrnrns show the causal connection between Edi/onc s alleged
ry from the Cloud Nine Defendants' use of lidizone^s
crtising ideas in its advertisements. Cloud Nine's
advertising activities "caused [Edi/onCs) mjui\
not
merely exposed it." See Novell 141 I-.MI H VKO
C\p ;

:

.\i}i?'

.ti .0'_-."» *» sre UIM> Addendum. • -..k: j ; i . .u->. •;.•• -i. ; t

Dccisioi i < Iate< I.lx h : n < ( mil >ei 1 1,2006: it 11 12 (Exl ill >it " ^ '; '").
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j n regards to the issue of apportionment oj defense costs. I hiigard's

argument in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is based upon the h>lk i.
Insi ii ai ice" provisions llnl p n i n d e d I'M 'in n|ii,i! dMiihnlinn n| defense costs w 1 ten other
valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss covered by the policy.
(API 7 APP v ; ,,) 655-656).
20,

Ohio Casualty responded to I hitgard's motion lot sumnmiy ludjjiiu/iil

arguing, in p.til lliiil tin "< Kin i Insni'.inu." pio\isi<>ns unl\ applies Io concurrent
coverage of another insurer for losses that occurred during the June 10. 2oo [ u i i m c '••
2002 policy period. Ohio Casualty further argues ih<ti because the "Other insurance"
provisions were inapplicable to si tccessive ii ISI n at ice policies, tt le "tii i le oi i the i isk" •
defense cost allocation method mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel v.
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. And Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (1997) controls. (API T A P P v. 6, at

\tm \m\ i
21.

In its Order and M e m o r a n d u m Decision, the district court rejected Ohio

Casualn *s "link; on the risk" method, finding that the language of the "Other Insurance"
Prtn iMons i on- >J* «; .-. h.-.. * - Casualty ,MM) i inward i"*'hcics apph ;o me case such
t

-

•

••

• • - . > :

..

.

•

:
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Ohio Casualty argues that the method of sharing set
forth in the insurance policies' Other Insurance provisions
only applies to circumstances in which there are two
concurrent primary policies, which have overlapping
insurance policy periods. Such a limited application is not
supported by the specific language in the provisions. Nothing
in the provisions' language restricts their application to the
circumstance of overlapping and/or concurrent insurance.
The introductory paragraph described the other insurance
simply as insurance which is available to the insured for u a
loss we cover." The term "loss" is a very broad term, and
such "loss" can be caused by multiple "offenses" under
Coverage B which can span successive policy periods. Had
the insurers mean to limit the application of the Other
Insurance provision to concurrent instances only, they could
have drafted the language differently. As the policies stand
now, there is no limiting language.
Also, Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation method—
which includes allocating a six month period of time to the
Cloud Nine Defendants (for a period of time during which
they were unable to find and obtain insurance)—essentially
advocates the position that an insurer has a duty to defend
only those claims covered by its insurance policy. That
proposition is directly contrary to Utah case law, which
requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims
in the same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to
claims outside the policy. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Arnica Mut.
Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006) ("'[I]f an insurer
has a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend
them all'") (quoting Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum, 127
F.3dl5, 19(l st Cir. 1997).
Based on the plain language of the insurance policies
and Utah law regarding the scope of an insurer's duty to
defend, the court holds that the defense costs in the Edizone
case (incurred and to be incurred) are to be shared by Ohio
Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis.
(APLT APP v. 13, at 2077-2078; see also Addendum, Order and Memorandum
Decision, dated November 14, 2006 at 16-17 (Exhibit "A")).
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Cast ialt;y did i lot appeal the first part of the court's ruling rindim: i hat both insurers had a
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APP,v. 13, at 2148-2149).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
• Tl le disti ict coi n I: grai ited pai tial si it i ii t tai: y ji idgi i te i it ii t fav or of that Ohio Casualty and Unigard each owe a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in
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"loss we cover" shows the insurers' intent to share when any other primary insurance
covers a loss, whether the insurance is concurrent, successive, or a different type of
liability coverage altogether (e.g. CGL policy, homeowners policy, professional liability
policy). Indeed, application of the policies' Other Insurance provision in this case
follows and is consistent with this Court's decision in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997), and specifically that the decision's
statement that courts apply equitable principles when apportioning defense costs among
insurers "unless express policy language decrees the method of apportionment" Sharon
Steel, 931 P.2d at 140. The Sharon Steel decision does not mandate, as Ohio Casualty
asserts, that the time on the risk method of apportionment is the only proper method of
apportionment permitted under Utah law.
Moreover, the equal apportionment of defense costs between Ohio Casualty and
Unigard, as provided by the expressed language of the Other Insurance provision,
comports with the basic tenets of Utah insurance law that an insurers duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify, and that when an insurer owes a duty to defend one
claim of a complaint it must defend all claims alleged in the complaint. See Benjamin v.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, ^ 24-25, 140 P.2d 1210. Consequently, when two
insurers owe the same insureds a duty to defend, their duties to those insureds in
defending all claims are equal. Ohio Casualty's method of allocation of months on the
risk (requiring an allocation of defense for six months of no insurance be borne by the
insureds) directly contradicts that tenet of an insurer's duty to defend all claims, as it

results ii i tl ic ii isi it ei oi lly 1 1a v ii ig to defend 1 1 lose clain is c overed i n idei its ii i.si irance
policy in time and content.
Accordingly, the Court should answer the certified question that the defense costs

"eqi lai shares" i i lethod set foi tl i ii i tl le Oil ler Insurance provision contained in Ohio
Casualty's and Unigard's Insurance Policies.
ARGUMENT
SHOULD BE ALLOCA I EI) EQUALI , \
f TWEEN OHIO CASUALTY AND UNIGARD UNDER THE EQUAL
SHARES METHOD PROVIDED BY THE OTHER INSURANCE
PROVISION.
m E

A,

D £ F E N S E CoSTS

The Other Insurance Provision \pp!ic" To AFK? Pr~vHr^ For The Method \ H"
Equal Sharing Of Defense Costs Between Ohio <"a^uali* .nut Unioard
Upon deter i :t lii lii ig tl lat botl i Ohio * •: a;
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Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit, the district -.our was laced with the question
of how the insurers should share in that defense duty, and more specifkuih luw >in i id
defei lse costs be allocated ai i ic i ig tl le in isi it c i s U' it! lii I tl i : last decade, tl lis Coi irt
addressed that topic of allocation of defense costs in the case of Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (I Jtal I 1997).
1.

i

The Sharon Steel decision involves, among other questions oi insurance a n erage,
a claim of equitable subrogation brought by insurer Aetna Casualty against two other
insurers which issi led policies to SI lai on Steel Coi poi atioi i (""'"SI lai oi l Steel''"11) ov ei apei iod
ol P O K • : ;J .< . -I

! t-c underlying litigation against Sharon Steel inv olved claims
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brought by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), for liability of
costs associated with clean up of decades (as much as seventy years) of disposal of
hazardous wastes from milling ore at Sharon Steel5s Midvale, Utah property. Aetna
provided defense to Sharon Steel in the CERCLA action and after reaching settlement of
that action, it filed suit seeking contribution for payment of defense and indemnification
costs from the other insurers which issued policies to Sharon Steel. Sharon Steel, 931
P.2datl30-31. 6
On appeal of Aetna's contribution action, this Court addressed a number of issues,
including ruling that Aetna had a legal right to make a claim of contribution and equitable
subrogation against the other insurers for reasonable defense costs. See id. at 136-140.
In recognizing the right of equitable subrogation, the court acknowledged insurers' equal
obligations to defend the insured:
Whether an insurer can compel contribution from a coinsurer
who is equally obligated to defend is a question that resulted
in a split of authority. Some jurisdictions have held that
because the duty to defend is personal to each insurer, the
obligation is several and where many carriers are obligated to
defend, each separate carrier is neither entitled to divide the
duty nor require contribution from another absent a specific
contractual right. . . . However, the trend in other jurisdictions
have been to allow an insurer, under the doctrines of
contribution or equitable subrogation, to recover costs of
defense from the other insurers who are equally obligated to
defense yet failed to do so. . .
*

*

*

6

*

Unigard recognizes that the facts of the Sharon Steel case are more complicated than
the above-described summary of facts. However, for purposes of explaining its ruling
regarding apportionment of defense, the brief summary of the facts should suffice.
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We agree with ihosc juiisdiUiims that ha\e ..iiwv'ved
contribution where one insurer has paid more than its fair
share of the defense costs. Where it can he .4io\\n ih.it a coinsurer failed to pa\ its share vlYne defense expenses, flu!
insurer should n*»1 he rewarded and paymenl excused when
another co-insurer has taken upon itself the provision of that
defense.
hi ;tl i W, I >K.
Upon establishing the right of equitable subrogation, tlie court addressed the issue
of apportionment of the defense costs; "Because this conn iind;> ;n.a Aetna is e. \-.\w^ . )
he leiiubursed Im Iliose defense expenses t( p;ud in excess ol its fan > m . we derm ill
prudent to offer guidance to the trial com t in apportioning those defense costs." Id. at
140. Tlie court then, in essence, set out a two-part scheme for considering and
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policies to determine whether the language provides for a metliod of apportionment, atid
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The court, in Sharon Si< d did not first examine the language of the insurancepolicies to determine a i i i c ; , . , e; apportionment as it appears thai [lie parties did mil
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provide such information and/or did not make such arguments. Rather, the court began
its analysis by considering the second part of the scheme, providing guidance to the trial
court on remand in fashioning an equitable method of apportionment. Id. at 140. The
court found that the most equitable method of apportionment for the facts of the case,
involving a long period of continuing injury (disposal of hazardous waste) over multiple
policies, was a time on the risk method, taking into account both the years on the risk and
the policy limits of each insurance policy. The court also found that a certain amount or
share of the defense costs should be allocated to the insured because it was "either selfinsured, uninsured, or for some other reason has no outside coverage" for many of the
years (1908-1965) the insured was disposing hazardous waste at the property site. Id at
141.
2.

Applying The Sharon Steel Decision To This Action.

Following the decision in Sharon Steel, the Court in this case should first look to
and consider whether the language of the insurance policies issued by Ohio Casualty and
Unigard provide a method of sharing or apportioning of defense costs. The Ohio
Casualty and Unigard Policies contain identical provisions entitled Other Insurance and
Methods of Sharing (collectively "Other Insurance"), which address the circumstance of
coverage under multiple policies of insurance and the sharing of the insurer's obligations.
The provisions provide, in relevant part:

7

In footnote, the court explained that neither party in the case provided thorough
briefing on the apportionment issue and "|w]e have therefore been limited to our own
resources in fashioning an equitable apportionment method." Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at
140 fn. 18.
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Other Insurance
If other valid and collectible iiisuuince is a\ ailahK u> ihe insured for a loss
we cover under Coverages A or B of this Co\ eragc Part, our obligations are
limited as follows:
a. Primary Insurance
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies, it this insurance *>
primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of the other insurance
is also primary. Then, we will share with all that other insurance by the
method describe in c. below.
b Excess Insui ance
^:

%

t

*

c. Method of Sharing
If all of the other insurance permits contribution b\ equal shares, we wiii
follow this method als(> IJnder this approach each insurer contributes
equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limn nf insurance or none rf
the loss remains, whichever comes first.
AI >I : I A PP, v. 2, at 342-43, st :. .,• M - v
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provision contained in both polii/ic plarnb and unambiguously provides that when other
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injury as alleged u, ihc Edizonc Suit, there should iv w\- v-qual sphi of defense costs
between Ohio Casualty anil I -miiard Accordingly, undei the .V/i,/<>// MCL! two-part
schen le for ai laly zii ig appoi tioi n i iei it of defei ise costs, tl ic lai iguage of tl le Otl i zi
Insurance provision decrees the method of sharing, showing the intent of the insurers to
contractually coi i iinit to equal division of defense costs.
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3.

The Language Of The Other Insurance Provision Does Not Limited Its
Application Solely To Circumstances In Which The Insurance Policies
Have Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance.

Ohio Casualty argues the Other Insurance provision only applies and is limited to
the circumstance in which there are concurrent primary policies, which have overlapping
insurance policy periods, and do not apply to successive primary insurance policies, as is
the circumstance in this case. See Tenth Circuit Opening Aplt. Brief at pp. 16-22. That
limited application is simply not supported by the expressed language of the Other
Insurance provision.
There is no language within the foregoing Other Insurance provision which restrict
its application to the circumstance of concurrent/overlapping insurance only. The
introductory paragraph provides:
Other Insurance
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a
loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our
obligations are limited as follows . . . .
APLT APP, v. 2, at 342 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5, at 924 [Unigard Policy]
(emphasis added). That language describes the other insurance clearly and simply as
insurance which is "available to the insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or
B". Id. (emphasis added). Other than the term "we"8, the policies do not specifically
define any of the terms used in that phrase, such as the terms "loss" or "cover," and
therefore those terms are accorded their usually accepted meaning under Utah law. See
8

The Policies defined the term "we" as: "The words 'we', 'us5 and 'our' refer to the
company providing this insurance." APLT APP, v. 2, at 333 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and
v. 5, at 912 [Unigard Policy].
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S. W. Energy v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 UT 23, ^12, 974 P.2d 1239, 1242 ("Courts
determine the legal import of insurance policies, affording the policy terms their usually
accepted meanings and giving effect to and harmonizing to the extent possible all policy
provisions."). The term "loss" is and has been defined as:
Loss. Loss is a generic and relative term. It signifies the act
of losing or the thing lost; it is not a work of limited, hard or
fast meaning and has been held synonymous with, or
equivalent to "damage", "damages", "deprivation",
"detriment", "injury", and privation". Mason v. City of
Albertville, 276 Ala 68, 158 So.2d 924, 927.
*

*

%

*

The word loss in insurance policy in its common usage means
a state of fact of being lost or destroyed, ruin or destruction.
Sitzman v. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 133 Ind.App. 578,
182N.E.2d448,450.
Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990) at 945. The term "cover" is defined as: "Cover.
To protect by means of insurance; sometimes orally pending issuance of policy." Id. at
365.
Under the foregoing meanings of the terms "loss" and "cover", the phrase "for a
loss we cover" is a broad phrase encompassing all forms of injury, damage or loss
covered by means of insurance (e.g. bodily injury/property damage and personal and
advertising injury) which loss the insurer of the subject policy also covers; and such
phrase does not limit or require the loss/injury to occur during the period of the policy.
Therefore, the phrase "for loss we cover" encompasses both isolated incidents of
injury/damage, triggering the circumstance of concurrent/overlapping coverage; and also
encompasses a progressive or continuing type of injury/damage claim caused by a
tortious offense continuing over a period of time, which spans and triggers successive
97

policy periods. The latter type of progressive or continuing injury/loss is particularly
pertinent when allegations of advertising injury are made, as they were in the Edizone
Suit. The term "Advertisement" is defined by the Policies as:
"Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or
published to the general public or specific market segments
about your goods, products or services for the purpose of
attracting customers or supporters.
APLT APP, v. 2, at 343 [Ohio Casualty Policy] and v. 5 at 925 [Unigard Policy].
Advertisement, as defined, can involve isolated events (e.g. placement of an ad in a
magazine) or a continuous or stream-like events (e.g. website broadcast). Accordingly,
the Policies do not state a specific temporal period in which the advertisement is deemed
to have occurred or caused offense and therefore cover progressive/continuing loss/injury
from continuous advertisement.
The phrase describing other insurance as insurance which is "available to the
insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B" does not have temporal
restricting language and is therefore a general and broad phrase describing any insurance,
whether concurrent, overlapping or successive, which is available to the insured that
covers a loss also covered under Coverages A or B of the Insurance Policy. The
language used in the Other Insurance provisions show an intent on the part of insurers to
agree to equal methods of contribution between successive insurers, even if the insurers
do not cover the exact same risk, but rather cover the same kind of risk which contributed
to the overall covered loss/injury covered by both policies. Had the insurers meant to
limit and restrict the application of the Other Insurance provision to circumstances of
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overlapping and concurrent insurance policy periods only, as Ohio Casualty asserts, the
provision should include temporal limiting language, such as:
"If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the
insured for an occurrence or offense we cover under
Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are
limited as follows . . . ."
or, even more plainly,
"If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the
insured during the same period of time this insurance is in
effect, and for an occurrence or offense we cover under
Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are
limited as follows
The Insuring Agreements of the Policies temporally limit coverage for an "occurrence"
and offenses" to occur during the policy period, but the Policies' Other Insurance
provision does not temporally limit or require the "loss" to only occur during the policy
period.9 The Other Insurance provision, therefore, clearly does not expressly provide
limiting language as Ohio Casualty claims such that that the provision only applies to
situations of concurrent/overlapping policies. Accordingly, in following the two part
scheme for analyzing apportionment of defense costs under the Sharon Steel decision, the
express policy language of the Insurance Policies involved in this matter decrees the
method of apportionment of defense costs between successive insurers Ohio Casualty and
Unigard.
Indeed, the term "loss" is a term that is only used in the general liability portion of the
Insurance Policies a few times in addition to its use in the Other Insurance Provision. For
example the term "loss" is used when describing "loss of earnings" in the Supplementary
Payment section of the Policies, and is used in the Policies when describing "loss of use"
in relation to defining "property damage". APLT APP, v. 2, at 338 [Ohio Casualty
Policy] and v. 5 at 920 [Unigard Policy].
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4.

The Taco Bell Decision And Other Authorities Do Not Support A
Finding By This Court That The Other Insurance Provisions Apply
Only To Circumstances of Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance.

Ohio Casualty cites to and relies upon the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004) and
authorities cited therein, to support its claim of limited application of the Other Insurance
provision. See Tenth Circuit Aplt. Brief at pp. 18-22. Ohio Casualty's reliance on the
Taco Bell decision and other authorities supporting for the position that Other Insurance
provisions have limited application to concurring/overlapping insurance is mistaken for a
number of reasons.
a.

The Taco Bell Decision.

Similar to the facts involved in this case, the Taco Bell case involved a declaratory
judgment action to determine the duties of two successive liability insurers to provide
defense to a fast food corporation for a suit brought against it by an advertising agency
alleging misappropriation of an advertising campaign. Upon finding that both successive
insurers owed a duty to defend the corporation, the United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, addressed the district court's finding of equal allocation of defense costs
between the insurers. Taco Bell, 388 F.2d at 1078.
As to the specific allocation of defense, one of the insurers, Continental, asserted
that the allocation between the insurers should be based on the ratio of time on the risk by
the insurers for the specific period of misappropriation, such that the other insurer,
Zurich, would bear the brunt of the allocation of defense costs. The court rejected
Continental's argument stating:
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But such an allocation, which would assign the lion's share of
the costs to Zurich, would be even more arbitrary than the
district court's 50-50 split. Had Wrench sued only in respect
to the misappropriation that occurred before October 7, 1997,
it is entirely speculative what fraction of the defense costs
that Taco Bell ultimately incurred in defending against the
suit would have been incurred. Remember that while the later
commercials contain misappropriations that the earlier ones
did not, such as the hole-in-the-commercial idea, those
commercials also repeat the basic misappropriation-the
misappropriation of the idea of "Psycho Chihuahua"
advertising campaign. Although Zurich's "prior publication"
defense to its duty to defend Taco Bell from Wrench's suit
has failed, probably most of the damages alleged by Wrench
can be traced to what we are calling the basic
misappropriation, which was published while Continental's
policy was in force.
Id.
After rejecting Continental's apportionment scheme, the court pointed out a
problem it saw with the district court's reliance upon the other insurance provisions to
determine the allocation of defense costs. The court stated:
If two insurers have identical other-insurance clauses in
policies that cover the same risk, a common and deliciously
simple solution is to divide the liability between them 50-50.
But this analysis does not fit the case in which the two
policies, each with an "other insurance" clause, insure merely
the same kind of risk, but not the same risk because the
policies are successive. To apply "other insurance" clauses in
such a case would make insurers liable in part for occurrences
outside the period covered by their policies. Douglas
Richmond, "Issues and Problems in 'Other Insurance',
Multiple Insurance and Self-Insurance," 22 Pepp. L. Rev.
1373, 1376-77(1995).

Id. at 1078-79. Even though the Seventh Circuit court pointed out the problem it saw
with the district court's analysis of other insurance provisions, the court of appeals
ultimately affirmed the district court's 50-50 allocation, as the best method before it. Id.
There are a number of problems with Ohio Casualty's reliance on the Taco Bell
decision to support its position that the Other Insurance provisions in this case do not
apply to situations involving successive insurers. First, while the Taco Bell Court
questions the application and use of an Other Insurance provision in apportioning defense
costs among successive insurance policies, the court only analyzes the Other Insurance
provision in the abstract and fails to consider and interpret the actual language of the
Other Insurance provision. In this jurisdiction, the two-part scheme provided by the
Sharon Steel decision requires an analysis of the language of the Insurance Policies to
determine apportionment among the insurers. As shown in the prior section, "the plain
language" of the Other Insurance provisions involved in this case apply to successive
insurance policies and provide for the method of equal apportionment of defense costs
between successive insurers Ohio Casualty and Unigard.
Second, while the Taco Bell Court questions the application of the Other Insurance
provision to successive insurance policies, it also acknowledges a split of authority in the
courts as to application of the provision to successive insurance policies.:
As if life weren't complicated enough, however, there is an argument for
treating risks in separate periods as the same risk when a single tortious act
continues in successive periods, see Continental Casualty Co. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Federal Ins. Co. v.
Cablevision Systems Development Co., 836 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2nd Cir. 1987).

Taco Bell, 388 F3d at 1079.
In Cablevision Systems, cited by the Taco Bell court, the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the apportionment of defense costs between three
insurers who issued four successive CGL policies to the insured who was sued for alleged
antitrust violations. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling of apportioning defense
costs among the insurers equally and in doing so analyzed the Other Insurance provisions
contained in the successive policies. The court ruled that "the 'other insurance' clauses
in the instant case indicate an intent that contributions by the coinsurers to defense costs
should be in equal amounts." Cablevision Systems, 836 F.2d at 58. The Cablevision
Court also addressed a claim by one of the successive insurers that pro-rata division was
the proper method of apportionment over the other insurance equal share method because
two of the insurers were on coverage longer or at a bigger policy limit that the arguing
insurer. To that claim, the court stated:
The First Circuit in Aviles v. Burgos, 783 F.2d 270 (1 Cir.
1986), rejected a similar argument for pro rata contribution of
liability for indemnity losses. There, the insurance policies
contained the identical "other insurance" clauses as the three
CGL policies in the instant case. The court held that, based
on the language of the policies, the proper method of
apportionment between the insurers should be in equal shares.
The court stated " CIS [the insurer] took the risk that such
arrangement might not always be to its benefit when it
included such language in the policy." Aviles, supra, 783
F.2d at 282. We agree.
Cablevision Systems, 836 F.2d at 60 (emphasis added).

11

Lastly, while the Taco Bell Court questioned the use and application of the Other
Insurance provision in cases of successive insurance, it ultimately affirmed the lower
court's 50/50 allocation as the most attractive method of apportionment:
We need not chase this particular hare to ground [the
application of other insurance provisions to successive
policies], however, as the parties have not suggested any
better method of dividing the costs between the two
insurance companies in the circumstances of utter
uncertainty prevailing here than doing so 50-50.
Continental's proposed "time on the risk" allocation is even
less attractive, for the reason indicated earlier, that most of
Wrench's damages probably stemmed from the
republication of the basic idea for the Psycho Chihuahua
advertising campaign. So we won't disturb the district
court's allocation.
Id. Accordingly, the Taco Bell decision, once analyzing its opinion completely, does not
support Ohio Casualty's request for the Court to reverse the district court's equal
apportionment of defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard.
b.

Other Authorities Supporting And Rejecting The Proposition
That Other Insurance Provisions Only Apply To Circumstances
Of Concurrent/Overlapping Insurance

As set out by the Tenth Circuit in its Order requesting, there is split among courts
and other authorities regarding whether Other Insurance provisions are limited to risks
covered by concurrent/overlapping policies,10 or whether other insurance provision apply
to risks of the same kind covered in separate successive policies when the loss/injury

10

See Taco Bell, 388 F.3d at 1078-79; St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilant Ins.
Co., 919 F.2d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1990); Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in
"Other Insurance, " Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1373, 137677 (1995); Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability
Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 278 (1997).
1A

continues over successive periods.11 Addendum, Tenth Circuit Order, dated April 28,
2009 at 9 (Exhibit "B").12 From a review of the cases and authorities finding that other
insurance provisions have limited application to only concurrent/overlapping policies, the
central basis for their conclusion is that successive insurers do not insure the same risk
and such application would unjustly make consecutive insurers "liable in part for
occurrences outside the period covered by their policies." See Douglas R. Richmond,
Issues and Problems, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. at 1376-77. The flaw in that analysis is that
neither the courts nor the scholars appear to have carefully analyzed and construed the
language of the other insurance provisions, nor considered the provisions' language in the
context of the specific loss/injury. They have only considered the concept in the abstract
as to the general notice of an insurer's intent to only cover claims falling within the
policy period. As shown in Section A.2 of this Brief, analysis of the language of the
Other Insurance Provisions in this case yields the result that the provisions apply to the
successive insurance policies of Ohio Casualty and Unigard, particularly given the
advertising injury alleged in the Edizone Suit. Moreover, while the notion appears sound
that insurers would not intend to make themselves liable for damages occurring outside
See Cablevision, 836 F.2d at 58; Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 722
N.W.2d 283, 304 (Minn. 2006).
Since the Tenth Circuit Order requesting certification, an additional court has weigh
in on the issue. See Boston Gas Company v. Century Ind. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 308
(Mass. 2009) (finding that the policies' other insurance clauses do not reflect an intention
to cover losses from damage outside the policy period.); but see also Emhart Ind. v.
Century Ind. Co., 359 F.3d 57 (1 st Cir. 2009) (in rejecting an insurer's attempt to limit
defense costs to the "during the policy" language of the policy, the court stated: u[t]here
is no connection between limiting coverage by the policy period and the amount of
defense of defense costs, which weighs strongly against reading the Policies in the way
that Century proposes.") (emphasis within).
1C

their policy period, such notion ignores the law and circumstance that if the insurer owe a
duty to defend one claim alleged in the complaint, they have a duty to defend all claims
alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, with respect to defense duties, insurers often
provide defense coverage for claims falling outside of the policy coverage. See
discussion infra Section B.
In light of the foregoing, the Court should answer the certified question, finding
that the defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone
Suit should be allocated between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the "equal shares"
method set forth in the Other Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio Casualty and
Unigard Policies.
B.

Utah's Law Regarding An Insurer's Duty To Defend Justifies Apportioning
Defense Costs By Equal 50/50 Shares Between Ohio Casualty and Unigard.
In addition to finding that the Other Insurance provision provides for an equal

share method of apportioning defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard, Judge
Campbell found that the general rule that an insurer owes a duty to defend all claims
alleged in a suit also justifies apportionment of defense costs equally between Ohio
Casualty and Unigard. In doing so, the district court relied on and cited to the recent
ruling in the case of Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, 140 P.2d 1210. The
district court's ruling in regards to the Benjamin Decision's declaration is correct, and
provides further justification for finding that the defense costs should be allocated
between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under an "equal shares" method set forth in the
Other Insurance provisions.

1.

Utah Law Regarding The Duty To Defend

Under Utah law, "an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to
indemnify." Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 133 {citing Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc, v.
United States Fid & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986). The duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify in several respects. First, the duty to defend arises
when the "insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability under the insurance
policy." Id. In order words, an insurer has a duty to defend "even if.. . the insurer is
ultimately not liable to indemnify the insured." Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate ofTherkelsen,
27 P.3d 555, 560 (Utah 2001).
Second, an insurer has a duty to defend "even if the allegations in the suit are
groundless, false, or fraudulent." Deseret Federal, 714 P.2d at 1147. Therefore, the duty
to defend exists regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove the merits of their claim.
See id. (an insurer cannot "simply say, cWe don't believe the plaintiff can prove what he
is alleging.'").
Third, the duty to defend one claim creates a duty on the part of the insurer to
defend all claims alleged in the underlying suit. See Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.,
2006 UT 37, \ 25, 140 P.3d 1210. This part of an insurer's defense duties provides, in
particular, justification and support for apportioning the defense costs equally between
Ohio Casualty and Unigard, as co-insurers of the Cloud Nine Defendants.
2.

The Benjamin Decision

In Benjamin, a case involving questions of insurance coverage for claims of
negligent and intentional sexual misconduct on the part of the insured, the Utah Supreme

in

Court explained an insurer's defense obligation in relation to a circumstance where there
is only one covered claim (negligent infliction of emotion distress) alleged in the lawsuit.
The court stated:
Because Arnica owed a duty to defend the negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims, Arnica owed a duty to defend all
of the claims brought by Borthick and Allen. u[W]hen there
is covered and non-covered claims in the same lawsuit, the
insurer is obligated to provide a defense to the entire suit, at
least until it can limit the suit to those claims outside of the
policy coverage." Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice
§ 136.2[D] (2d ed. 2006); see also Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v.
Greenbaum, 127 F.3d 15, 19 (1 st Cir. 1997) ("[I]f an insurer
has a duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend
them all.").
Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at f 25; see also Overthrust v. Home Ins. Co , 676 F.Supp. 1086,
1091 (D. Utah 1987) ("insurer must defend all claims brought at the same time, even if
some of the claims are not covered by the policy.").
Under the Benjamin Court's declaration, Unigard and Ohio Casualty each owe an
equal duty to the Cloud Nine Defendants to provide a defense to all of the claims alleged
in the Edizone Suit. That defense includes: [1] defense of causes of action which are not
covered by the contractual terms of the policies (e.g. claims of patent infringement as
excluded from coverage by the Policies); [2] defense of claims statutorily prohibited from
coverage (e.g. punitive damages, see Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-101 (2005) (uNo insurer
may insure or attempt to insured against... (4) punitive damages.")) and; [3] defense of
claims not covered because they occurred before and/or after the effective dates of the
policy periods of the insurance policies (e.g. for Ohio Casualty alleged conduct of the
Cloud Nine Defendants occurring after June 10, 2002 and for Unigard alleged conduct of
18

the Cloud Nine Defendants occurring before December 12, 2002). See APLT APP, v. 1,
at 54-103 [Complaint] and v. 10, at 1577-1622 [Second Amended Complaint]. Since
both insurers owe the duty to defend all claims alleged in the Edizone Suit, whether or
not the claims are actually covered by one or the other insurer's policy, their respective
duty to defend is exactly the same and equal; and consequently their share in paying for
the defense should be equal.
A number of courts from around the nation have considered and/or relied on the
basic tenet of an insurer's duty to defend all claims to find that apportionment of defense
costs should be divided equally among insurers. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Vigilant Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1990); Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision
Systems Development Co, 836 F.2d 54, 58 (2n Cir. 1987); Wooddale Builder, Inc. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 772 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 2006); Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar.
Assoc, v. Southwest Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tx. Ct. App. 1999); Ames v.
Continental Cas. Co., 340 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). In Cablevision, the Second
Circuit explained the basis for equal sharing of defense costs: "Under New York Law, the
duty of each of the three insurers to defend Cablevision is separate and equal. Since the
insurers cannot defend 'part' of the antitrust claims in the underlying Nishimura action, it
is logical that the insurers bear the costs of defense equally." Cablevision, 836 F.2d at
58.
Accordingly, the Benjamin Court's declaration that an insurer has a duty to defend
all claims alleged in a suit creates equal duties to defend for insurers whose policies have

been triggered, thereby justifying an apportionment of defense costs on a equal basis
between the insurers.
3.

Ohio Casualty's Asserted Method Of Apportionment Of Defense Costs
Is Contrary To Utah's Law Regarding An Insurer's Duty to Defend.

Ohio Casualty argues that since the Benjamin case does not involve the issue of
apportionment of defense, its ruling cannot be used to avoid applying the time on the risk
apportionment as adopted in the Sharon Steel decision. See Tenth Circuit Opening Aplt.
Brief at pp. 24-26. Ohio Casualty is mistaken.
As previously demonstrated, the Benjamin decision's declaration that an insurer
owes a duty to defend all claims provides additional justification for equal apportionment
of defense costs. Moreover, the Benjamin declaration of a duty to defend all claims also
demonstrates how untenable Ohio Casualty's time on the risk method of apportionment
of defense costs is in this action.
Ohio Casualty advocates that the Court should apportion defense costs based on
how many months the respective insurers and the insured were on the risk. Since the
Cloud Nine Defendants' alleged wrongdoing began upon termination of the License
Agreement on March 11, 2002, Ohio Casualty claims that its defense responsibility and
share of defense costs should be for three months, from March 11, 2002 to June 10, 2002,
when the policy it issued to the Cloud Nine Defendants expired. Next, Ohio Casualty
claims that the Cloud Nine Defendants should contribute and share in the defense costs
based on a period of six months in which it was uninsured from June 11, 2002 to

December 12, 2002.

Lastly, Unigard should contribute and share in the defense costs

for a period of the remaining time based on the months it insured the Cloud Nine
Defendants from December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2005. Accordingly, that method
of months on the risk computes to the following division of defense costs:
Ohio Casualty
The Cloud Nine Defendants

3/45ths ( 6.6%)
6/45ths (13.3%)

Unigard

36/45ths (80.0%)

Such method of apportionment of defense costs essentially argues for adoption of a rule
that an insurer has a duty to defend only those claims covered by its insurance policy.
That rule "is directly contrary to Utah case law, which requires an insurer to defend [all]
covered and non-covered claims" in a lawsuit. Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at ^f 25.
Consequently, while the Benjamin decision does not address apportionment of
defense costs between insurers, its declaration that insurers are obligated to defend all
claims alleged in a suit (covered and non-covered claims) is relevant to this case and
provides justification and rationale for adopting an equal share method of apportionment
between Ohio Casualty and Unigard in this case.
4.

The Benjamin And The Sharon Steel Decisions.

Lastly, Ohio Casualty asserts that in relying upon the Benjamin decision as a basis
for ruling for equal apportionment of defense costs in this case, this Court will reject the
ruling in the Sharon Steele decision. Again, Ohio Casualty is mistaken.
Unigard understands that the Cloud Nine Defendants were uninsured for that period of
time because Ohio Casualty made the decision to cease underwriting insurance for
businesses like Cloud Nine (Ohio Casualty timely provided notice of that decision to no
longer underwrite). The Cloud Nine Defendants did not find replacement coverage until
Unigard issued a policy to them in December 2002.
41

The Sharon Steel decision does not, as Ohio Casualty asserts, require or mandate
that Utah courts apply a "time on the risk" formula in all cases to determine the
apportionment of defense costs between insurers. Rather, the Sharon Steel Court
addressed the topic of apportionment as "guidance" for the trial court in apportioning
defense costs for that specific case, which: (1) involved disposal of hazardous waste over
decades, (2) involved a number of insurers insuring numerous policies periods (19661980), and (3) involved a long period of time in which the insured had no insurance or no
evidence of insurance (1908-1965). See Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d 130-31. Under those
facts, the Sharon Steel court analyzed various methods for equitable apportionment of
defense costs and found that a time on the risk/policy limits formula, which allocates
defense costs among the insurers and also to the insured because of the long period of
time it was not insured, was the equitable method of allocation of defense costs for that
case. Id. at 141-42. The Sharon Steel court did not in any way rule, however, that the
guidance it set forth in its decision should apply to every case of apportionment of
defense costs.14
Moreover, the facts of the Sharon Steel case are very different and distinguishable
from the facts before the Court in this action. Unlike the facts in the Sharon Steel case,

14

Indeed, the Sharon Steel Court recognizes that the principles which it set forth in its
decision may not be a workable formula for application by the trial court. In footnote, the
Court stated:
We recognize that the principles set forth in this opinion may not lend
themselves to simple and straightforward application to the factual
circumstances of this case. We therefore grant considerable discretion to the
trial court in devising a formula which best reflects our decision.
Id. at 142 fn. 22.
£1

this action involves two insurers in which their policies contain identical Other Insurance
provisions providing for equal share contribution between the insurers for a loss each
covers. That policy language, unlike the facts in the Sharon Steel case, shows the intent
on the part of the insurers to defend the insured in a manner consistent with the general
principles of insurance law, which includes the principle that an insurer owes a duty to
defend all claims, such that multiple insurers have an equal duty to defend all claims.
Had Ohio Casualty meant to limit its duty to defend to something less than a duty to
defend all claims when there is other insurance available, it needed to state that limitation
in a clear and unambiguous way within its policy. See Novell, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.,
141 F.2d 983, 986 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Language limiting an insurer's duty to defend an
insured must be clear, unambiguous, and sufficiently conspicuous in order to give proper
notice to the insured of the limitations on the duty to defend.") (quoting Simmons v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Ohio Casualty did not
state or place such a limitation on its duty to defend in its policy.
Additionally, while in this case the insured has a period of time of six months in
which it was not insured, that period of time is very different from the facts found in the
Sharon Steel case in which the insured did not have insurance (or evidence of insurance)
for a period of 50+ years. Given the amount of years of not being insured (50+ years), as
compared to the amount of years of being insured (14 years), it is understandable that the
Sharon Steel court found that it was equitable to apportion defense costs to the insured.
The facts in this action, as shown above, do not merit apportionment of defense costs to

the Cloud Nine Defendants and do not merit a disregard of the duty to defend all claims
principle.
Accordingly, the Sharon Steel decision is distinguishable from this action, and the
Court will not contravene its holding by ruling that equal (50/50) apportionment of
defense costs between Ohio Casualty and Unigard is proper in this action. The Court
should, therefore, answer the certified question, finding that the defense costs incurred in
defending the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit should be allocated between
Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the "equal shares" method set forth in the Other
Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio Casualty and Unigard Policies.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellee, Unigard Insurance Company,
respectfully requests that this Court to answer the certified question, finding that the
defense costs incurred in defending the Cloud Nine Defendants in the Edizone Suit
should be allocated between Ohio Casualty and Unigard under the "equal shares" method
set forth in the Other Insurance provisions contained in the Ohio Casualty and Unigard
Policies.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION

THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY and WEST AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants,

ORDER
AND

vs.

CLOUD NINE, LLC, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. L05-CV-88TC

Defendants.

UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Intervenor and CrossClaimant.

The parties seek a ruling regarding the scope of two insurance companies7 duty to defend
the Cloud Nine Defendants in the separate case of Edizone LC v. Cloud Nine LLC, Case No.
L04-CV-117-TS (D. Utah). One of the insurance companies, Unigard Insurance Company,
agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in Edizone, whereas the other insurance company,
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, rejected the Cloud Nine Defendants' initial tender of
defense. Unigard, in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, contends that Ohio Casualty,
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like Unigard, has a duty to defend.1 Unigard further contends that Ohio Casualty should share
equally in paying the costs that Unigard has incurred (or will incur) defending the Edizone case.
The court finds that the allegations in Edizone's Complaint allege an advertising injury
triggering a duty to defend on the part of Ohio Casualty and Unigard. Also, based on the
language of the Ohio Casualty and Unigard policies, the court finds that Ohio Casualty must pay
fifty percent of the Cloud Nine Defendants' defense costs in Edizone, with Unigard paying the
remaining fifty percent. Accordingly, Unigard's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Unigard insured the Cloud Nine Defendants for a portion of the period at issue in the

Edizone case, and it accepted the Cloud Nine Defendants' tender of defense under a reservation
of rights when Edizone was filed in August 2004. Ohio Casualty also insured the Cloud Nine
Defendants for a portion of the relevant period, but it rejected their initial tender of defense.
Ohio Casualty then filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it has neither a
duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify the Cloud Nine Defendants. Unigard intervened as a
plaintiff, contending that it also does not have a duty to defend or indemnify, but if it does, then

'West American Insurance Company is also a plaintiff in this declaratory judgment
action. But because no one claims that West American has a duty to defend, it is not part of the
motion before the court. (See Unigard's Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. at p. 20 n.3
("Unigard finds that the Edizone Suit does not allege a covered advertising injury against the
Cloud Nine Defendants which occurred during the effective periods of the insurance policies
issued by West American (June 1998 through June 2001), and therefore does not claim that West
American has a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants.").)
2

No disputed facts exist (indeed, the analysis is based on allegations in Edizone's
Complaint and the policy language). The court will discuss the facts throughout the Order as
necessary to provide context and analyze the legal issues.
2
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so does Ohio Casualty because the policies are essentially identical.3 Additionally, Unigard
seeks a finding that if both insurers have a duty to defend, Ohio Casualty must share equally in
paying defense costs (incurred and to be incurred).
It is important to note that after Unigard filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Ohio Casualty agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants under a reservation of rights, based
on what it believes are materially new allegations in the Second Amended Complaint filed in
Edizone. Because Ohio Casualty has since acknowledged a duty to defend from the date of
Edizone's Second Amended Complaint (filed in January 2006), the duty-to-defend issue raised
by Unigard's Motion is narrowed to whether Ohio Casualty owed a duty to defend before the
Second Amended Complaint was filed.
A.

The Insurance Policy

Ohio Casualty issued a Commercial General Liability Policy to Cloud Nine, LLC, and
Easy Seat, LLC, for the period of June 10, 2001, to June 10, 2002. (Ohio Casualty Policy No.
BKO (02) 52 34 34 82, attached as Ex. A to Decl. of Rebecca Hill.) The Policy provided
coverage for "'Personal and Advertising Injury Liability71 (Coverage B), as follows:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance
applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit"
seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured
against any "suit" seeking damages for "personal and advertising injury" to which
this insurance does not apply.. . .

(Id. at p. 5 of CGL Coverage Form (emphasis added).) According to the Policy, "personal and

3

Unigard's Motion addresses only the duty to defend, not the duty to indemnify. Both
Unigard and Ohio Casualty contend that no duty to indemnify exists under their respective
policies. But that is an issue for another day.
3

Case 1:05-cv-00088-TC

Document 71

Filed 11/14/2006

Page 4 of 17

advertising injury" is an "injury . . . arising out of one or more of the following offenses: .. . [t]he
use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'

" (Id. at p. 13 (emphasis

added).) "Advertisement" is defined as "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general
public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of
attracting customers or supporters." (Id. at p. 1L)
The Policy also contains certain exclusions. In particular, the insurance policy does not
apply to "personal or advertising injury" that was "caused by or at the direction of the insured
with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict 'personal
and advertisement injury'" or that arose "out of oral or written publication of materials, if done
by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity." (Id. at p. 5 (emphasis
added).)4
B.

Edizone's Complaint

The genesis of the Edizone suit is the alleged breach of a License Agreement allowing the
Cloud Nine Defendants to manufacture, use and sell patented elastomer gel technology and
product known as "Gelastic," kCGelIyComb," and ^Intelli-Gel" (another name for "GellyComb").
In its initial complaint,5 Edizone asserts causes of action for (1) patent infringement; (2) breach

4

Coverage B of the Unigard Policy provides liability insurance coverage for personal and
advertising injury. The insuring provision of Coverage B of the Unigard Policy is identical to
insuring provision of Coverage B of the Ohio Casualty Policy. (See Unigard Policy CGL
Coverage Form at p. 6, attached as Ex. B to Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.) The definition of
"Personal and Advertising Injury" contained in the Unigard Policy is also identical to the Ohio
Casualty Policy. (See id. at p. 17.) And the definition of "advertisement" and policy exclusions
in both policies are the same in all relevant aspects. (See id. at pp. 6-7, 14.) Accordingly, the
court's ruling on the duty to defend extends to Unigard as well.
5

As noted above, only the allegations of Edizone's original Complaint (or First Amended
Complaint, which adds defendants but does not change the allegations (see Ex. F attached to Hill
4
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of contract; (3) constructive fraud; (4) fraudulent non-disclosure; (5) federal law trademark
infringement; (6) common law trade name infringement or common law unfair competition;
(7) deceptive trade practices under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; (8) misrepresentation and
false designation of origin under the federal trademark act; and (9) conspiracy. (See Edizone
Complaint, attached as Ex. E to Hill Deck)
According to Unigard, Edizone's Complaint triggers a duty to defend under the
"advertising injury" portion of the Policy because it alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants used
Edizone's "advertising ideas" (the trade names GellyComb, Gelastic, and Intelli-Gel) in their
advertisement, all to Edizone's detriment Unigard focuses on Edizone's Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth causes of action to argue that Edizone's allegations trigger Ohio Casualty's duty to defend
under the Policy's Coverage B for "personal and advertising injury" liability.
In its Complaint, Edizone describes its Sixth Cause of Action as "Common Law Trade
Name Infringement [and] Common Law Unfair Competition." It alleges that the Cloud Nine
Defendants "have adopted and taken for themselves the use of Edizone's valuable trade names
[GellyComb, Gelastic, and/or Intelli-Gel] by using said names in their businesses, on their
websites, and in conjunction with their goods. . . ." (Edizone Compl. ^ 103, attached as Ex. E to
Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.) Edizone further alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants' use of
those trade names constitutes "common law trade name infringement and unfair competition and
is designed to cause confusion and mistake and to deceive purchasers into believing that
Defendants' products are somehow sponsored by, made by, or associated with Edizone." (Id.)

Deck)) are relevant. The court does not consider the allegations of Edizone's Second Amended
Complaint, because Ohio Casualty has agreed to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants from the
date the Second Amended Complaint was filed.
5
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Edizone contends that, "(a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Edizone will
suffer, and has suffered, injury to its trade names and its established good will in the market.
Defendants' acts, misconduct, and misappropriation of Edizone's trade names are also likely to
cause confusion, mistake, and deceive the public, and have already caused actual confusion.
Such injuries are irreparable injuries for which there is no adequate remedy at law." (Id. ^ 105.)
Under Edizone's Seventh Cause of Action, the Cloud Nine Defendants are accused of
violating the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3, which "prohibits
persons and companies from engaging in deceptive trade practices." (Id. 11 108.) Edizone alleges
that the Cloud Nine Defendants ''engaged in many of the deceptive trade practices enumerated in
[§ 13-1 la-3], including . . . the causing of confusion or misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship, approval, or certification of their goods or services; or . . . the causing of confusion
or misunderstanding as to their affiliation, connection, association with, or certification by
Edizone." (Id.)
And, finally, Edizone's Eighth Cause of Action alleges "Misrepresentation and False
Designation of Origin" under 15 U.S.C § 1125(a). According to Edizone, the Cloud Nine
Defendants "appropriated the names GellyComb, Gelastic and/or Intelli-Gel and are using [the
names] in their own businesses . . . in a prominent fashion." (kf ^[ 110.) In particular, Edizone
alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants "use the above trade names to get people to their
businesses, where competing products are advertised and sold using said trade name."6 (IdL
1113.)

6

The full set of allegations may be found in Edizone's Complaint (in particular,
paragraphs 101 -114), which is attached as Exhibit E to the Declaration of Rebecca L. Hill.
6
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Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998).
Unigard's Motion involves the interpretation of two insurance contracts and a
determination of the insurers' rights and obligations under those contracts. Utah law (which
applies in this diversity action) provides that insurance contracts a are interpreted under general
contract principles" and that interpretation of such contracts is a question of law to be determined
by the courts. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 46 F.3d 1005, 1008 (10th Cir. 1995); see also
Morris v. Mountain Tel. & Tel., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983) ("When the existence of a
contract and the identity of the parties are not in issue and when the contract provisions are clear
and complete, the meaning of the contract can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary
judgment."). Moreover, in Utah, as a general rule, "an insurer's duty to defend is determined by
comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint." Fire Ins.
Exch. v. Estate of Therkelsen, 27 P.3d 555 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, the question of whether
the insurers have a duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants and the question of how defense
costs should be allocated are questions of law. Partial summary judgment on the issues presented
by Unigard's Motion is appropriate at this time.7

7

Ohio Casualty filed a Rule 56(f) motion seeking a continuance until certain discovery
could be conducted. The court denied that motion from the bench during the hearing.
7
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DUTY TO DEFEND
A duty to defend arises "when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability

under the insurance policy." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah
1997). When the allegations, if proven, show "there is no potential liability [under the policy],
then there is no duty to defend." Deseret Fed. Sav. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147
(Utah 1986). Under Utah law, the court must interpret the insurance policy as it would any
written contract, under general contract interpretation principles. Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins.
Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Utah 2006). If one claim or allegation triggers the duty to defend, the
insurer must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered claims), at least until the suit is
limited to the non-covered claims. Id at 1216. Finally, and perhaps most important: "'When in
doubt, defend.'" l± at 1215 (quoting Appleman on Ins. Law & Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed.
2006)).
A.

The Novell Two-Part Test

Utah state court decisions have not construed "advertising injury" language in insurance
policies. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has established a two-part test to determine
whether an advertising injury is alleged, and, consequently, a duty to defend is triggered. See
Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 1998). Under that test, the court must first
determine whether the complaint alleges a "predicate offense," that is, "one of the offenses
specifically listed in the [Policy's] definition of'advertising injury.'" IcL at 986. If the first part
of the test is satisfied, then the court must examine whether there is a causal connection between
the alleged injuries and the advertising activities. Id.
Applying the Novell two-part test for establishing an "advertising injury" to the Edizone
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case, the court finds that the allegations set forth in Edizone's Complaint satisfy the two-part test
and trigger a duty to defend under the policies issued by Ohio Casualty and Unigard.
1.

Part One of the Novell Test

First, Edizone's Complaint alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants committed the
predicate offense of'use of another's [Edizone's] advertising idea in your [Cloud Nine's]
'advertisement.'" (See Policy at p.3.) Neither the Policy nor Novell define "advertising idea."
But courts from other jurisdictions have done so. An 'advertising idea" is an "idea for calling
public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to
increase sales or patronage." Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 528 N.W.2d
486, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (applying ordinary meaning to term "advertising idea"); see also
Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 852 A.2d 98, 109 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (suggesting that
advertising ideas are "discrete images or text in an advertisement"); Transportation Ins. Co. v.
Freedom Elec, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (an advertising idea is" £ any
idea or concept related to the promotion of a product to the public'") (quoting Hyman v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). The discrete trade names
of GellyComb, Gelastic, and Intelli-Gel expressly describe and promote the gel-like and elastic
qualities of the material, calling the public's attention to the desirable qualities of Edizone's
products. Those trade names are "advertising ideas" as that phrase is understood by the average,
reasonable purchaser of insurance. See Draughton v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 771 P.2d 1105,
1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (when interpreting insurance contract, court should construe policy as
it "would be understood by the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance"); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Utah law and
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citing Draughton for same proposition).
Courts also find that where there is no exclusion specific to trademark (as is the case in
Ohio Casualty's Policy), the phrase "advertising idea" is a broad enough term to include and
provide coverage for trademark infringement. See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Travelers Indem. Co. of Amer., 343 F.3d 249, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that "vast majority"
of courts conclude that trademark infringement falls within advertising injury coverage for
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business); CAT Internet Servs., Inc. v.
Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 333 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2003) (use of trademarks in connection
with marketing and sales for the purpose of gaining customers constitutes misappropriation of
advertising idea); Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 749 (3d
Cir. 1999) ("A trademark can be seen as an 'advertising idea': It is a way of marking goods so
that they will be identified with a particular source... . [Allegations of trademark infringement
arguably allege misappropriation of an advertising idea."); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. StunFence,
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (N.D. 111. 2003) (finding duty to defend against trademark
infringement claim under policy language covering liability for "use of another's advertising
idea"). See also Novell, 141 F.3d at 985 ("'Ambiguities in an insurance contract are construed
against the insurer.'") (interpreting Utah law) (citation omitted).
Certainly Edizone has alleged "use" of those advertising ideas in the Cloud Nine
Defendants' advertisements.8 For example, Edizone alleges that the Cloud Nine Defendants used

8

To the extent that cases cited by Ohio Casualty hold that "misappropriation of an
advertising idea" does not encompass trademark infringement claims, the court finds those cases
distinguishable because the Policy here contains the common term "use," which is broader than
"misappropriation." See also Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072,
1079 (N.D. Ill 2003) (distinguishing decisions limiting "misappropriation of advertising idea" to
10
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Edizone7s trade names "in their businesses, on their websites," they "compete directly with
Edizone in the same markets" and such conduct "is designed to cause confusion and mistake and
to deceive purchasers into believing that Defendants' products are somehow sponsored by, made
by, or associated with Edizone." (Edizone Compl. at ^ 103.) A business's website, except for
the web pages concerning the business's contact information and history, is generally an
advertisement for the business's goods, services or products. And certainly a website would fall
within the Policy's definition of "advertisement": "a notice that is broadcast or published to the
general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose
of attracting customers or supporters." (Policy at p. 11.) Also, Edizone alleges under its claim
for Misrepresentation and False Origin that the Cloud Nine Defendants used the trade names
Intelli-Gel, GellyComb, and Gelastic 'to get people to their businesses, where competing
products are advertised and sold using" those trade names. (Edizone Compl. f 22.) In claiming
that the Cloud Nine Defendants unlawfully used Edizone's trade names on their websites,
Edizone is claiming use of Edizone's advertising ideas in Cloud Nine's advertisements.
Moreover, Edizone alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act, which
specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade practices occurring in advertising. "The
purpose of [the Utah Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading, and false
advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-1. Clearly, the crux of a
cause of action for violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is advertising.
In short, the Edizone allegations fall within the definition of advertising injury as the

common law tort of misappropriation in part because the policy at issue in StunFence employed
the word "use," not "misappropriation").
11
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offense of "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement,"' and the first part of the
Novell test is satisfied.
2.

Part Two of the NoveH Test

The second part of the Novell test is also met because Edizone's Complaint alleges a
causal connection between Edizone's injuries and the Cloud Nine Defendants' advertising
activities. Edizone alleges that it has suffered injury to its trade names as a result of the Cloud
Nine Defendants' misconduct and it expressly seeks relief prohibiting the Cloud Nine
Defendants from using the trade names and trademarks on their websites, in advertising or in any
other way. Those claims show the causal connection between Edizone's alleged injury from the
Cloud Nine Defendants' use of Edizone's advertising ideas in its advertisements. Cloud Nine's
advertising activities "caused [Edizone's] injury-not merely exposed it." See Novell, 141 F_3d
at 989.
3.

"When in doubt, defend."

Even if the court were to find that Edizone's Complaint presents factual questions or an
uncertainty regarding whether an advertising injury is alleged, the insurers still have a duty to
defend until those uncertainties are resolved. "Where factual questions render coverage
uncertain,... the insurer must defend until those uncertainties can be resolved against coverage.
c

When in doubt, defend.'" Benjamin, 140 P.3d at 1215 (quoting Appleman on Ins. Law &

Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)).
B.

Policy Exclusions

Ohio Casualty argues that it owes no duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants because
the allegations in Edizone's Complaint fall within two different intentional act exclusions in the
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Ohio Casualty Policy According to those exclusions, the Policy does not apply to personal and
advertising injury "caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act
would violate the rights of another and would inflict 'personal and advertising injury"' or
"arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured
with knowledge of its falsity

" (Policy at p 5 ) Ohio Casualty contends that these

intentional act exclusions apply because Edizone alleges, or at least its allegations suggest, that
the Cloud Nine Defendants knew of their violation of Edizone's rights and knew the illegality of
their conduct
But the causes of action asserted against the Cloud Nine Defendants do not necessarily
require that, in order to find liability, the defendant have knowledge of falsity or knowledge that
its conduct would cause advertising injury See 15 U S C § 1114(1) (setting forth elements of
trademark infringement), 15 U S C § 1125(a) (setting forth elements of false designation of
origin), Utah Code Ann § 13-1 la-3 (defining deceptive trade practices), George v H S
Peterson, 671 P 2d 208 (Utah 1983) (discussing the elements of common law trade name
infringement)
Courts have found that intentional act exclusions do not negate the duty to defend unless
there is no potential for liability under the allegations See, e g , Central Mut Ins Co v
StunFence, Inc , 292 F Supp 2d 1072, 1081-82 (ND 111 2003) (m trademark action, "insurer
may refuse to defend only if it is clear from the face of the pleading that all of the allegations in
the Underlying Action fall outside of the policy's actual or potential coverage') (emphasis in
original), Elcom Tech , Inc v Hartford [ns Co of the Midwest, 991 F Supp 1294, 1298 (D
Utah 1997) (holding that "knowledge of falsity" exclusion did not negate duty to defend because
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false advertising claim could be proved by establishing reckless indifference); Union Ins. Co. v.
Knife Co., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (holding that intentional act
exclusion did not negate duty to defend: "Since intent is not a required element of trademark
infringement, there could be a finding of liability . . . even if the infringement were innocent");
Citizens Ins. Co, v. Pro-Seal Serv. Group, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that intentional act exclusion did not negate duty to defend trademark suit because there
was potential for liability even if infringement were negligent, reckless, or innocent).
Given the potential for liability in Edizone's allegations, the exclusions in the Policy do
not free Ohio Casualty from its duty to defend. This conclusion is consistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's declaration in Benjamin regarding the duty to defend alternative theories of
intentional and unintentional liability.
Where an insurance policy obligates an insurer to defend claims of unintentional
injury, the insurer is obligated to do so until those claims are either dismissed or
otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with coverage. Even where the
complaint details egregious, intentional conduct, an expected injury exclusion like
the one found in the Homeowners Policy does not relieve an insurer of its duty to
defend claims of unintentional injury. Inferences and assumptions about an
insured's intent to injure are improper and inconsistent both with the wellaccepted practice of alternative pleading and with our oft-repeated instruction that
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of the insurance."
Benjamin, 140 P.3d at 1215-16 (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519,
521 (Utah 1993)).
For all the foregoing reasons, the court holds that both Unigard and Ohio Casualty have a
duty to defend the Cloud Nine Defendants in the underlying action of Edizone LC v. Cloud Nine
LLC, Case No. 1:04-CV-117-TS (D. Utah).
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ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS
Now that the court has determined that both Unigard and Ohio Casualty have a duty to

defend against all of Edizone's claims, the next question concerns how they should share the
defense costs. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "when apportioning defense costs among
insurers, courts 'apply equitable principles . . . unless express policy language decrees the method
of apportionment.7" Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997)
(emphasis added).
In this case, the Unigard and Ohio Casualty policies have identical provisions for Other
Insurance and Method of Sharing, which provide, in relevant part:
Other Insurance
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we
cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as
follows:
a.

Primary Insurance
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If this
insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of
the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all
that other insurance by the method described in c. below.

Method of Sharing
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares,
we will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer
contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of
insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first.
If any other insurance does not permit contribution by equal shares,
we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the
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total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers.
(Ohio Casualty Policy CGL Form at p. 10 (emphasis added); Unigard Policies CGL Form at
p. 13, attached as Ex. B to Hill Decl.) Unigard contends that the "Method of Sharing" provision
contained in both policies plainly provides for allocation of equal shares, and because there are
two insurers, the court should find as a matter of law that an equal split of defense costs is the
appropriate allocation.
Ohio Casualty contends that the Other Insurance provisions quoted above do not apply
because the policies are successive, not concurrent. Further, Ohio Casualty advocates the Sharon
Steel equitable apportionment of costs based on "time on the risk" rather than an equal share
approach between the insurers. According to Ohio Casualty, it owes 3/45ths in defense costs
based on a ratio of months on the risk. The court disagrees.
Ohio Casualty argues that the method of sharing set forth in the insurance policies' Other
Insurance provisions only applies to the circumstance in which there are two concurrent primary
policies, which have overlapping insurance policy periods. Such a limited application is not
supported by the specific language of the provisions. Nothing in the provisions' language
restricts their application to the circumstance of overlapping and/or concurrent insurance. The
introductory paragraph describes the other insurance simply as insurance which is available to the
insured for "a loss we cover." The term "loss" is a very broad term, and such "loss" can be
caused by multiple "offenses" under Coverage B which can span successive policy periods. Had
the insurers meant to limit the application of the Other Insurance provision to concurrent
instances only, they could have drafted the language differently. As the policies stand now, there
is no limiting language.
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Also, Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation method—which includes allocating a sixmonth period of time to the Cloud Nine Defendants (for a period of time during which they were
unable to find and obtain insurance)—essentially advocates the position that an insurer has a duty
to defend only those claims covered by its insurance policy. That proposition is directly contrary
to Utah case law, which requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in the
same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy. See, e.g., Benjamin
v. Arnica Mut Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Utah 2006) (c"[I]f an insurer has a duty to defend
one count of a complaint, it must defend them all.'") (quoting Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Greenbaum,
127R3dl5, 19(lstCir. 1997)).
Based on the plain language of the insurance policies and Utah law regarding the scope of
an insurer's duty to defend, the court holds that the defense costs in the Edizone case (incurred
and to be incurred) are to be shared by Ohio Casualty and Unigard on an equal basis.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Unigard Insurance Company's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Insurers' Defense Obligations is GRANTED.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge
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I. BACKGROUND
EdiZone is a product and technology developer that licensed patents and
other intellectual property to Cloud Nine for the manufacture and sale of an
elastometer gel technology and a product known as "Celastic" and "GellyComb." 1
In the federal case against the Cloud Nine defendants, EdiZone alleged that those
defendants had breached a licensing agreement allowing the manufacture, use,
and sale of its products. In its initial complaint, EdiZone asserted claims for (1)
patent infringement; (2) breach of contract; (3) constructive fraud; (4) fraudulent
non-disclosure; (5) trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (6)
common law trade name infringement and unfair competition; (7) deceptive trade
practices in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 13~lla-3, part of the Utah Truth in
Advertising Act; (8) misrepresentation and false designation of origin, in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (9) conspiracy.

1

EdiZone's website reports that "[a] unique product evolved out of EdiZONE's
work with elastomers and gels. Called Intelli-Gel™ or Gellycomb™, this soft
elastomer waffle structure conforms gently to broad surfaces and easy
penetration of sharp surfaces. This unique combination of characteristics has
changed the world of cushioning and toys." EdiZone reports that the Gellycomb
products have been used by a foot products company and by a company that
produces a pressure relief mattress overlay for critical care patients and a device
to protect the heels of immobile patients against ulceration. See
http://www.edizone.com.
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Ohio Casualty issued a commercial general liability insurance policy to the
Cloud Nine defendants that provided coverage for "Personal and Advertising
Injury Liability" in the following terms:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which
this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the
insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will
have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit"' seeking damages
for "personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not
apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense and settle any
claim or "suit" that may result.
Aplt's App. vol. II, at 337.
The policy also stated that:
This insurance applies to:
"personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense arising out of
your business but only if the offense was committed in the "coverage
territory" during the policy period.

id,
Ohio Casualty's policy covered the period from June 10, 2001 to June 10,
2002, while Unigard insured Cloud Nine for the three-year period from December
12, 2002 to December 12. 2005. From June 10, 2002 to December 12, 2002,
Cloud Nine did not have commercial liability insurance.
After EdiZone filed its lawsuit in the federal district court in Utah, the
Cloud Nine defendants requested both Ohio Casualty and Unigard to provide a
defense. Unigard agreed to defend, but Ohio Casualty refused. Ohio Casualty
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then filed this declaratory judgment action alleging that it had neither a duty to
defend nor indemnify the Cloud Nine defendants.
Unigard intervened as a plaintiff- It first asserted that, like Ohio Casualty,
it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Cloud Nine defendants. In the
alternative, Unigard asserted that, if it did have a duty to defend or indemnify,
then Ohio Casualty had the same duty-because the policies are essentially
identical.
The district court ruling at issue in this case concerns Unigard's motion for
partial summary judgment. In that motion, Unigard argued that (a) Ohio Casualty
had a duty to defend the EdiZone case; and (b) Ohio Casualty should share
equally in paying defense costs.
The district court ruled in favor oi Unigard on both issues. First, the court
said, the EdiZone action alleged "an advertising injury" and, as a result, both
Ohio Casualty and Unigard had a duty to defend the action. Second, the district
court concluded, the two insurance companies should share equally in paying
defense costs. Aplt's App. vol. XIII, at 2095. 2

2

In the course of this declaratory judgment action, Ohio Casualty changed its
position to some extent: it agreed to defend the Cloud Nine defendants under a
reservation of rights, based on what it believed were materially new allegations in
the Second Amended Complaint filed in the EdiZone action. Ohio Casualty
subsequently acknowledged that it had a duty to defend the EdiZone case from the
filing of the Second Amended Complaint. Thus, with regard to Ohio Casualty,
the district court was required to decide only whether that insurer had a duty to
defend before the filing of that complaint. Rec. vol. XIII, at 2096.
(continued...)
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In support of the latter ruling, the district court relied on the "Other
Insurance" provision of the Ohio Casualty policy, which stated:
4. Other Insurance
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a
loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our
obligations are limited as follows:
a. Primary Insurance
This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. If this
insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of the
other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all that other
insurance by the method described in c. below.

c. Method of Sharing
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, we
will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer
contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of
insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first.
If any of the other insurance does not permit contribution by equal
shares, we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the
total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers.
Id. vol. II, at 342-43 (emphasis supplied); see also Rec. vol. III. at 604-05 (identical
provision of Unigard's policies).
The district court also invoked the broad scope of an insurer's duty to
defend under Utah law. In its view, "Ohio Casualty's suggested allocation
method . . . essentially advocates the position that an insurer has a duty to defend

2

(...continued)
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only those claims covered by its insurance policy." i i vol. XIII, at 2110
However, the court explained, "that proposition is directly contrary to Utah case
law, which requires an insurer to defend covered and non-covered claims in the
same lawsuit until the insurer can limit the suit to claims outside the policy." Id.
Following the district court's decision, Ohio Casualty and Unigard paid
fifty percent of the defense costs of the EdiZone case, as directed by the district
court. In July 2007, the two insurers reached a settlement in the underlying case
with EdiZone. As a result of the settlement, EdiZone dismissed its claims against
the Cloud Nine defendants, and the remaining issues in this declaratory judgment
action became moot.
II. DISCUSSION
Ohio Casualty now argues that the district court erred in relying upon the
"other insurance" provision of the policies to conclude that the defense costs
should be allocated equally between Ohio Casualty and Unigard. In its view, the
"other insurance" provision only applies if there is other insurance "for a loss we
cover."

Here, during the period that Ohio Casualty provided insurance to Cloud

Nine (June 10, 2001 to June 10, 2002), Unigard did not provide insurance to the
Cloud Nine defendants. Because the "other insurance*' provision does not apply,
Ohio Casualty continues, defense costs should be allocated by use of the time-onthe-risk method adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Sharon Steel Corp, 931
P.2dat 140.
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In response, Unigard defends the district court decision Its argument turns
on the policy's use of the phrase "[i]f other valid and collectible insurance is
available to the insured for a loss we cover." Aplt's App. vol. II, at 342, It
maintains that "[a] 'loss we cover' encompasses an isolated incident of
injury /damage claim, triggering the circumstance of concurrent/overlapping
coverage, and encompasses a continuing injury/damage claim caused by a tortious
act continuing over a period of time, which spans and triggers successive policy
periods Therefore, the Other Insurance provision applies to both concurrent and
successive policies." Aple's Br. at 13
Ohio Casualty's argument is supported by courts and scholars who have
concluded that other insurance clauses do not generally apply to successive
polices See Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co , 388 F.3d 1069, 1078-79
(7th Cir 2004) (criticizing a district court's "highly questionable" application of
an other insurance clause to successive policies) (Illinois law), St Paul Fire &
Marine Ins Co v Vigilant Ins C o , 919 F 2d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating
that "[it] appears that the district court may have been incorrect in relying on the
policies' ^ other insurance' clauses to resolve [the proper allocation of insurers'
responsibilities]

. .[,] such clauses apply only when the coverage is concurrent

Where, as here, the policies['] periods did not overlap at all, such clauses are not
applicable ") (North Carolina law), Douglas R Richmond, Issues and Problems in
"Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance," 22 Pepp L Rev
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1373, 1376-77 (1995) (stating that the characterization of successive policies as
"other insurance" is "seriously flawed" because "while successive policies might
insure the same type of risk, they do not insure the same risk" and because "so
generous a definition wrongly suggests that insurers might be liable for damages
occurring outside their policy periods"); Michael G. Doherty, Comment,
Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 278 (1997) (stating that "'[ojther insurance' clauses do not
provide a solution to the allocation problem because they were not meant to
allocate liability among successive insurers"); 23 Erik Mills Holmes et al.,
Holmes's Appleman on Insurance 2nd § 145.4[C] (1996) ('"Other insurance"
refers only to two or more concurrent policies, which insure the same risk and the
same interest, for the benefit of the same person, during the same period.
However, wother insurance' clauses are not intended to allocate liability among
successive insurers because they do not insure the same risk and would unjustly
make consecutive insurers liable for damages occurring outside their policy
periods.").
However, other courts have disagreed, applying other insurance clauses to
successive policies, as Unigard urges us to do here. For example, in Federal
Insurance Co. v. Cablevision Systems Development Co , 836 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.
1987), the Second Circuit held that, under New York law, "other insurance"
clauses in successive policies "indicatefd] an intent that the contributions by the
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coinsurers to defense costs should be in equal amounts " Like the district court,
the Second Circuit invoked the broad scope of an insurer's duty to defend,
"[sjince the insurers cannot defend 'part' of the antitrust claims against [the
insured] in the underlying . . . action, it is logical that insurers bear the costs of
defense equally " Id_ The Supreme Court of Minnesota has reached the same
conclusion. See Wooddale Builders, Inc , v Maryland Cas C o , 722 N W 2d 283,
304 (Minn. 2006) ("[WJhen the pro-rata-by-time-on-the-nsk method applies to
allocation of liability, and insurers participate in providing a defense to a common
insured .

defense costs are apportioned equally among insurers whose policies

are triggered ") (Minnesota law)
The Utah courts do not appear to have resolved the issue of whether other
insurance provisions may be applied to successive policies Although both Ohio
Casualty and Unigard contend that Sharon Steel supports their position, that
decision instructs courts apportioning defense costs among insurers "to apply
equitable principles

unless express policy language decrees the method of

apportionment " 93 I P 2d at ^140 Sharon Steel does not offer guidance on how
to interpret other insurance clauses in successive policies that provide for
"contribution by equal shares" "[i]f other valid and collectible insurance is
available to the insured for a loss we cover " Aplt's App vol II, at 15
Accordingly, we conclude that the question posed is controlling in this
proceeding Certification of that question would further the interests of comity
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and federalism by giving the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to answer it in
the first instance should it elect to do so under Utah R. App. P. 4 1 .
The Clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this certification order to
counsel for all parties. The Clerk shall also forward, under the Tenth Circuit's
official seal, a copy of this certification order and the briefs filed in this court to
the Utah Supreme Court.
We greatly appreciate the consideration of this request. This appeal is
ordered STAYEiD pending resolution of the certified question. 3

Entered for the Court

3

We note that this appeal does not involve the question of how to apportion the
ultimate costs of settlement in the Edizone case. Instead, it concerns only the
method of apportioning the costs of defense.
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The Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company,
Appellant,
Case No. 20090340-SC
No. 08-4003

v,
Unigard Insurance Company,
Appellee.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on certification of a
question of state law by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Utah Supreme Court accepts the
following question certified to it:
As to the EdiZone case described by the certification order,
whether the defense costs should be allocated between Appellant
and Appellee under the "equal shares" method set forth in the
"other insurance clause" of Appellant's policy or according to
the "time on the risk" method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997).
The certifying court has not filed any portion of the record
in this matter with this Court. Within fourteen days of the date
of this order, counsel for the parties shall advise this Court as
to what portions of the record they believe necessary for
consideration of the certified questions.

Following the expiration of the fourteen days, this Court
will request those portions of the record from the certifying
court and provide notice to the parties as to a briefing
schedule.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

"flafthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 18, 2009, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
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MARK D TAYLOR
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-0415
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